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Abstract 
This paper examines the roadmap of interest rate liberalization in China, 
including the current dual-track interest rate system and the future benchmark rate 
system. It provides a theoretical foundation for China to develop its own benchmark 
interest rate. A Vector autoregression model (VAR) is estimated to investigate the 
effectiveness of Chinese market interest rates, Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate 
(SHIBOR), and repo rates against different factors such as market size, volatility, 
transmission channels of monetary policy, and term structures of interest rates. The 
result shows that SHIBOR affects both the market and the economy. As SHIBOR 
promptly reflects the changes in currency markets, we argue that it has the potential to 
become China’s benchmark interest rate. 
 
Keywords: SHIBOR, interest rate liberalization, shadow banking.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Developing countries often adopt financially repressive policies, which aim at 
imposing control of fiscal resources and therefore hinder economic development. 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) introduced the theory of financial deepening, 
which suggests the abolition of excessive government interventions in financial 
markets. One of the key steps of financial liberalization is interest rate liberalization, 
which allows the level of interest rates for financing in monetary markets to be 
determined by market supply and demand. In an effective financial market, the 
benchmark interest rate, which is usually set by central banks, provides vital reference 
for financing costs and investment income. Benchmark interest rate with prompt 
response to fluctuations of markets is the prerequisite of interest rate liberation and a 
crucial step toward financial liberalization. Hence, the choice of benchmark interest 
rate has a profound influence on stability of interest rates. Table A presents the 
benchmark interest rates adopted by main economies around the world. 
 
Table A near here 
The Chinese government has instituted the reform of interest rate liberalization 
since 1993. Gradually, floating range of deposit and loan interest rates has been fixed 
by the People’s Bank of China. However, financial institutions other than commercial 
banks (i.e., the shadow banking sector) price their financial products according to 
market interest rate, and hence a dual-track interest rate system has been put in place 
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throughout the years. Over the past decade, the People’s Bank of China has 
considered using several market interest rates as benchmark interest rate, including 
the repo rate, rediscount rate, and the Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR). 
Since 2006, SHIBOR has intermittently conformed to volatility of main market 
interest rates.  
The main purpose of this paper is to examine whether SHIBOR or a bond 
repurchase rate provide more reference for financial market prices and better 
transmission for macroeconomic adjustments of the central bank. So far, there is no 
consensus on whether an interbank interest rate similar to LIBOR (namely, SHIBOR) 
or a bond repurchase rate is appropriate benchmark interest rate for China. 
Exploration on benchmark interest rate for China by comparison of several market 
interest rates available in China is rare in literature. Thus, this paper aims to illustrate 
the roadmap of interest rate liberalization in China and examine which market interest 
rate is appropriate benchmark interest rate for China.  
An empirical analysis is conducted in respect of market size, relationship among 
market interest rates, information content, term structure, and monetary policy 
transmission channel. The results show that a benchmark interest rate that is similar to 
LIBOR conforms to the situation in China.  
    This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the review of literatures. 
Section 3 demonstrates the background of the financial reform and financial market 
problems in China. Section 4 presents the research methodology and the empirical 
estimation results, which uncover the relationship among interest rates, transmission 
channels, and term structures. Section 5 concludes the paper and Section 6 states the 
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limitations and discusses possible future directions of interest rate liberalization.  
 
2. Literature Review 
In a developing country whose interest market is not fully liberalized, the 
forming mechanism of interest rate varies from time to time. For example, Edwards 
and Khan (1985) conclude that the formation of interest rates is linked to the openness 
of the financial system. Cho (1986) argue that for a country without a well-developed 
equity market, elimination of interest rate ceilings and government allocation of credit 
is not an efficient measure to interest rate liberalization. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) 
relate the lending rate stickiness of banks to the structure of the financial system. The 
shortage of competition in banking industry, limited international capital movement 
and the absence of negotiable short-term financial instruments (e.g., T-bills) make 
interest rates stick to monetary policy operations. Qin and Lu (1995) compare the 
process of interest rate liberalization in several developing countries, including 
Argentina, Chile, and Indonesia, and suggest that the People's Bank of China should 
ease restrictions on floating range of deposit and loan rates before the liberalization. 
Sa (1996) points to the dangers of possible rapid increase in interest rates brought by 
interest rate liberalization in an unstable macroeconomic environment with high 
inflation, unbalanced exchange rates, and ineffective regulatory and legal system. 
Rosen (2002) argues that bank interest rates not always keep pace with the 
fluctuations of market interest rates. In particular, when the price-cost margin is large, 
the response tends to be large as well.  
Byrd (1983) examines the significant changes and transitions in the role of banks 
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and financial systems in the financial reforms in the early 1980s. Chinese researchers 
analyze the continued financial reform from different perspectives. For example, 
Zhang (1995) concludes that the financial reform was remarkable but not profound 
because the most distinctive change was the scale of the financial market rather than 
the system and structure. Dai (2000) argues that the informal financial sector is vital 
to the success of financial reform in China. DaCosta and Foo (2002) illustrate the 
inadequacy of the financial reform and conclude that financial systems remain 
vulnerable to crises and the entry of foreign institutions. Wu (2002) indicates the 
necessary of banking reform in China. Lin (2003) suggests that China should develop 
financial institutions in rural areas. 
The People's Bank of China has been implementing both quantitative and 
price-based monetary policies. Nonetheless, the transmission mechanism has 
experienced various problems. For example, the increase in money supply caused by 
proactive monetary policies of the People's Bank of China from 1998 to 2002 had 
only “leaked” into the ‘black hole” in bank deposits and the pocket of equity market 
speculators rather than into the real economy (Pei and Xiong, 2003). Shao (2007) 
suggests that the dual-track interest rate system causes inefficiency in the transmission 
between interest rates and corporate investments. Saving deposits in various forms did 
not fluctuate with interest rates because of the ceiling on deposit rates. Most people 
deposit money for future expenditures such as education or medical expenses rather 
than investing in financial products of which price and return are based on market 
interest rates. Guo (2009) prove the inefficient transmission between interest rates and 
exchange rates or macroeconomic indicators by empirical analysis using cointegrated 
6 
model. 
Wang (2001) and Yi (2009) divide the gradual process of the interest rate 
liberalization into three stages: liberalization of deposit and loan rates, establishment 
of a benchmark interest rate, and formation of a central bank interest rate regime. Xu 
(2003) identifies three preconditions for interest rate liberalization: well-established 
legal system for financial supervision, market competition, and fiscal surplus. He 
suggests that China should not be hasty in implementing interest rate liberalization if 
these conditions are not fulfilled. Since 1982, The People’s Bank of China has 
allowed deposit and loan rates to fluctuate based on unchanged benchmark interest 
rate within a prescribed range. The fixing repo rate and SHIBOR are still not popular 
as benchmark rate.  
 
Dai and Liang (2006) compare the characteristics of the Federal funds rate and 
the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and conclude that the seven-day fixing 
repo rate (R007) has larger market dominance. R007 is easier to be measured and 
adjusted than the other two rates. Thus, the fixing repo rate could be an appropriate 
benchmark interest rate. Besides an indicator mirror the information revealed in the 
market, benchmark interest rate should change with open market operations (e.g., the 
Federal funds rate). However, Wu (2007) argues that SHIROR is more suitable than 
the Federal funds rate to be benchmark interest rate for China. Chen and Wu (2008) 
conclude that volatility of SHIBOR significantly correlates to that of other market 
interest rates. Such correlation demonstrates the potential of SHIBOR to be 
benchmark interest rate. In addition, SHIBOR is a relatively stable reflection of price 
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fluctuation in stock market. (Zhang and He, 2009). Feng, Guo and Huo (2009) 
investigate the relationship between SHIBOR, central interest rate, and reserve 
requirement, and conclude that monetary policy Granger-causes SHIBOR.  
 
3. Financial Reform in China 
China’s government implemented interest rate liberalization starting from 1993. 
Liberalization of Chinese interbank offered rate realized in 1996. Two years later, 
three policy banks (i.e., the China Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of 
China, and the Agricultural Development Bank of China) issued policy financial 
bonds with market-oriented interest rate to finance national construction. Thereafter, 
commercial banks are allowed to adjust loan and saving rates on the basis of 
benchmark interest rate within a range stipulated by the People’s Bank of China.   
The Chinese financial market is transforming. Unlike other developed countries, 
China adopts a special dual-track interest rate system and unique monetary policies. 
In a free money market, the prices of money and bonds are regulated by market 
supply and demand; the benchmark rate serves as the upper or lower bound of the 
market interest rate. In China, however, deposit and loan rates are decided by the 
central bank. He and Wang (2012) argue that it is not feasible to set collar of loan 
rates whereas setting cap is feasible; thus, the deposit rate is lower than the market 
equilibrium rate. This low deposit rate helps commercial banks obtain capital at low 
costs and therefore encourage such banks to grant loans at interest rates that below 
market equilibrium. Such over lending by commercial banks significantly improve 
capital liquidity, which may cause inflation if no control measure is imposed. In order 
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to strike a balance between deposit rates and capital liquidity, strict controls imposed 
by the People’s Bank of China result in various market limitations. Therefore, to 
realize market-oriented pricing in financial markets, financial reform which aims at 
interest rate liberalization need to be carried out. 
The interbank lending market of China is similar to that of the US but with 
significantly smaller market size. The People’s Bank of China performs open market 
operations by trading bonds and bills with 40 commercial banks. Bond repurchase 
rate is one of the prices available in this market. Treasury bonds, central bank bills, 
policy bonds, and so forth are traded under their respective repurchase agreements. 
The maturity of repurchased bonds range from one day to one year. 
The bond repurchase market in China has not yet consolidated, and the 
repurchase rate is not effectively transmitted to other market interest rates. Imitating 
LIBOR mechanism, the People’s Bank of China introduced SHIBOR, a monetary 
market interest rate based on the price quotations by 18 commercial banks with high 
credit ratings, on 7 September 2006. These quoting banks are the primary dealers of 
open market operations or market makers in the foreign exchange market and have 
sound information disclosure and active transactions in RMB in the Chinese money 
market. The SHIBOR Working Group of the People’s Bank of China decides and 
adjusts the panel banks, supervises and administrates the SHIBOR operation, and 
regulates the behavior of quoting banks and specified publishers in accordance with 
the Implementation Rules of SHIBOR. The maturities of SHIBOR rates are overnight, 
1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 9 months, and 1 year. Approximately 
22% of the interest rate swaps and all interest rate futures are priced with SHIBOR. 
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However, medium-term and long-term rates of SHIBOR are less likely to be used as 
reference interest rate because of the small market scale. Table 1 shows the 
comparison between SHIBOR and LIBOR. 
Table 1 near here 
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
The view that interest rate should be regarded as a policy target was brought 
forward in the late 1970s. Engle and Granger (1987) verify the co-integration 
relationship between different interest rate. Dickey, et al. (1991) provide statistical 
evidence that cointegration exist among M1, M2, nominal income and nominal 
interest rate, and this co-integration affect transmission of monetary policy to macro 
economy. Anderson, Granger and Hall (1992) argue that co-integration relationships 
exist between the different bond yields to maturity of U.S. Treasury bills, and the 
co-integrating vectors are defined by the spreads between yields when the Federal 
Reserve targeted short-term interest rate. Following the similar methods, the interest 
rate transmission has been perceived as empirically successful. One remarkable piece 
of evidence is the finding by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) that the Federal Funds Rate 
(FRB) well reflects expectations on movements of real macroeconomic variables. 
They suggest that a benchmark interest rate should be informative with regard to other 
open market interest rates and future movements of real macroeconomic variables, 
and should be a good indicator of macroeconomic control. Heffernan (1997) uses an 
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error correction model to capture the dynamic response of British interest rate to the 
fluctuation of central bank’s base rate, and suggests that imperfect competition in the 
retail banking market causes the adjustment differences of loan and deposit rate to the 
changes in LIBOR, which further influences the money transmission speed. Pesaran 
and Shin (1998) introduce the generalized impulse response analysis using 
fractionally integrated vector autoregressive model and analyze the interaction 
between variables with a vector auto-regressive error correction model. The funds rate 
is sensitive to the money supply, which is an apparent indicator of monetary policy, 
and this transmission work through both the bank loans channel and the bank deposit 
channel. The change of the Funds rate is then separated into anticipated and 
unanticipated components (Kuttner, 2001), and the changes in Bond rates and bill 
yields are mainly caused by the unanticipated movements. Atesoglu (2003) examines 
the bilateral causality between prime rate and funds rate. Walsh (2003) argues that 
interest rate measures are preferred to money supply measures as monetary demand 
varies considerably. In this paper, to test the effectiveness of the benchmark interest 
rate, we estimate the following VAR model: 
 
௧ܻ ൌ ܤ଴ ௧ܻ ൅ ܤଵ ௧ܻିଵ ൅ ܥ଴ ௧ܲ ൅ ܥଵ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ݑ௧,  (1) 
 
௧ܲ ൌ ܦ଴ ௧ܻ ൅ ܦ ௧ܻିଵ ൅ ܩ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ݒ௧,    (2) 
 
where Y represents non-policy variables, such as macroeconomic variables; P 
represents policy variables, including open market interest rates such as SHIBOR and 
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repo rates.  
 
4.1 Data Description and Summary 
SHIBOR, bond repurchase interest rate (repo rate), interbank borrowing (IBO) 
rate, interbank bond transaction rate, rediscount rate, and central bank bill interest rate, 
among others, all reflect certain market information and are possible to be benchmark 
interest rate. We compare primary benchmark interest rates in the international market 
and Chinese market rates to analyze the interest rate characteristics in China. Table 2 
lists the benchmark rates compared in the study. 
Table 2 near here 
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Observations of Funds, the overnight Federal funds rate are obtained from the 
official Federal Reserve’s website (www.federalreserve.gov). Observations of Bill, the 
three-month treasury-bill rate are obtained from the US Department of the Treasury 
(www.treasury.gov). LIBOR001 and LIBOR007 are the overnight and one-week 
Libor rates, respectively, obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(research.stlouisfed.org). SHIBOR001 and SHIBOR007 are the overnight and 
one-week SHIBOR, respectively, obtained from the official SHIBOR website 
(www.shibor.org). FR001 and FR007 are the overnight and one-week repo rates, 
respectively, and IBO001 and IBO07 are the overnight and one-week interbank 
offered rates, respectively (obtained from the RESSET database, www.resset.cn). The 
data cover the period from 1 January 2001 to 15 April 2013 because data of Chinese 
interest rates before the year 2001 are limited. Data of SHIBOR are only available 
from 2006; hence, we have fewer observations on SHIBOR compared with the other 
interest rates. 
Central refers to the central bank bill rate, which is one of the instruments for 
open market operations by the People’s Bank of China. We investigate the 
relationship between the central bank bill rate and the open market interest rate to see 
whether monetary policies affect market interest rates. The data cover the period from 
25 June 2002 to 20 October 2011. This interest rate is not continuous because the 
central bank did not issue bills on a daily basis. The data are obtained from CSMAR 
Solution (www.gtarsc.com). 
We first compare the international benchmark rates with the Chinese interest 
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rates in terms of market size, pattern, and other aspects. Thereafter, a comprehensive 
review will be conducted on the transmission mechanism between interest rates and 
macroeconomic activities. The following sections show that SHIBOR performs better 
in volatility tests and has more effective transmission in macroeconomic activities 
than other interest rates even though the repo rate are more popular in China. 
 
4.2 Market Size of Open Market Interest Rates 
From Table 3, the market size of the Chinese interest rate market is smaller than 
that of international interest rate markets, particularly the rediscount rate markets and 
the central bank bill interest rate markets. Thus, the rediscount rate and the central 
bank bill interest rate are less likely to be a reliable benchmark rate for Chinese 
financial market, given their relatively small trading volume and market size. 
Meanwhile, the rediscount rate and the central bank bill interest rate, which are 
intermediate targets of monetary policy, are not fully decided by the market. 
 
Table 3 near here 
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The bond repurchase market has grown rapidly since 10 years ago. The repo rate 
is more appropriate than interbank offered market rate to be benchmark interest rate 
because of its superior foundational role in the money market rate system. However, 
bonds pricing and earnings are based on different reference rates, a situation damage 
the setting up of benchmark interest rate.  
 
4.3 Interest Rates Volatility 
First, we plot all interest rate trends between 2001 and 2013 to measure the 
volatility. 
 
Figures 1 to 8 near here 
 
We can see from the graph that Chinese market interest rates, except for the 
central bank bill rate, seem to be less volatile than Funds, LIBOR, or Bill. Funds and 
the central bill rate are instruments of monetary policies, which may reflect 
macro-control target set by central banks. We conduct the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test with an intercept but without a time trend, given that not all interest rates 
have obvious trends from 2001 to 2013. We estimate the following regression: 
 
∆݅௧ ൌ ߤ ൅ ߮݅௧ିଵ ൅ ∑ ߙ௝∆݅௧ି௝ଷ௝ ൅ ݑ௧,    (3) 
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where i is the interest rate. The null hypothesis is as follows: 
 
ܪ଴: ݅௧ ൌ ݅௧ିଵ ൅ ݑ௧,      (4) 
 
Table 4 near here 
 
 
The ADF result also shows that the Federal funds rate is non-stationary at first 
but is stationary after first differencing. Similarly, data of LIBOR001, LIBOR007, and 
Bill, which are all non-stationary series at first, become stationary after first 
differencing. SHIBOR, repo, and IBO rates are stationary at the 1% level.  
To see whether the benchmark rate react rationally to market news, we test if 
asset prices decrease more in an environment with bad news than the price increase in 
an environment with good news. We adopt the EGARCH model to test the 
asymmetric effect. 
 
lnሺߪ௧ଶሻ ൌ ߱ ൅ ∑ ሺߙ௝ |ఌ೟షೕ|ටఙ೟షೕమ
௣
௝ୀଵ ൅ ߛ௝ ఌ೟షೕටఙ೟షೕమ
ሻ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ln	ሺߪ௧ିଵଶ ሻ௣௜ୀଵ ,  (5) 
where  
߱ stands for the average of long-term interest rate volatility; ߛ௝ is the asymmetric 
coefficient (i.e., leverage coefficient to show the leverage effect); and ߙ௝  is the 
symmetric coefficient. If ߛ௝ is small, the interest rate will not have a significant 
leverage effect on volatility. If ߛ௝  is positive, the interest rate will fluctuate 
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significantly during good news, and vice versa. ߚ௝  represents the relationship 
between the volatility for two consecutive days. We use the first-differenced interest 
rates in this study since all the international interest rates are I(1) series. 
 
Table 5 near here 
 
The most obvious result is that compared to international interest rates, the 
Chinese interest rates have significantly stronger leverage effects and tend to react 
more to good news than bad news (the		ߛ of the Chinese interest rates are higher by 
0.2 compared with the ߛ of the international interest rates, which is almost zero). 
This result reflects market irrationality on interest rates in China. SHIBOR reacts 
more quickly than the other two types of interest rates and performs better than repo 
and IBO rates in terms of leverage effect. 
 
4.4 Benchmark Test for Interest Rates 
We use the Granger causality test to examine the relationship between different 
interest rates. The following regression is estimated: 
 
ܺ௧ ൌ ∑ ܽ௜ܺ௧ି௜௟௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ௝ܾ ௧ܻି௝௟௝ୀଵ ൅ ݁௧,    (6) 
 
௧ܻ ൌ ∑ ܿ௜ܺ௧ି௜௟௜ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ௝݀ ௧ܻି௝௟௝ୀଵ ൅ ݑ௧,    (7) 
 
where l is the maximum lag of the model and takes the values one, two, and seven to 
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represent the causality effect in one day, two days, and seven days, respectively. 
 
Table 6 near here 
 
Table 7 near here 
Table 8 near here 
 
 
Table 6 shows that the overnight SHIBOR and one-week SHIBOR respectively 
Granger-causes the overnight repo rate. Inversely, either the overnight repo rate or the 
one-week repo rate Granger-causes the overnight SHIBOR or the one-week SHIBOR, 
thus showing that these two overnight rates have two-way causality effect.  
Tables 7 and 8 show that the IBO rate does not Granger-cause SHIBOR and the 
repo rate respectively. Repo rates (overnight and one-week) also Granger-cause the 
IBO rates, whereas the overnight SHIBOR does not Granger-cause the IBO overnight 
rate. 
Given that the SHIBOR and repo rates Granger-cause each other and that the 
repo rate has strong influences on the interbank offered rate, we suggest that the repo 
rate has a closer association with market signals than other market rates has.  
 
4.5 Monetary Transmission Channels 
4.5.1 Interest Rate as a Policy Target 
The People’s Bank of China usually manage money supply by purchasing or 
repurchasing government debt.  Figure 9 shows the long-term trend of the central 
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bank bill rate and SHIBOR, which tend to move in tandem in the long term. Before 
July 2008, both SHIBOR and the central bank bill rate were relatively high. However, 
these rates show tendency to decrease from 2008 to 2010, followed to increase since 
May 2010.  
 
Figure 9 near here 
 
 
The above discussion shows that the central bill interest rate is stationary at one 
stage, and SHIBOR is stationary most of the time. The regression model about 
SHIBOR001 and the first differencing of the central bank bill rate is estimated. Unit 
root test is carried out to examine the stationarity of the residuals. If the residual is 
stationary, we further test whether Granger causality exists between these two interest 
rates. 
SHIBOR001 ൌ 2.101 ൅ 0.375	d_Central,            (8) 
                      (1.3)    (4.54) 
SHIBOR007 ൌ 3.877 ൅ 0.726	d_Central,            (9) 
                      (24.1)    (5.302) 
 
We then apply the ADF test to the residuals. The results are −7.4 and −10.3, 
which are smaller than the t-statistics (−3.43). Thus, we use the Granger causality test 
to test the relationship between SHIBOR and the central bank bill rate. 
We test whether changes in the central bank bill rate will Granger-cause 
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SHIBOR. This causality is important as it represents the first step of monetary policy 
transmission. If the central bank bill rate can affect SHIBOR, SHIBOR will be a good 
intermediate target for the central bank to implement monetary policies and influence 
the financial market. 
Table 9 near here 
 
From Table 9, we conclude that changes in the central bank bill rate do slightly 
Granger-cause SHIBOR changes. The result is not strong due to a lower frequency of 
open market operations than that of changes in SHIBOR. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
investigate the direct effects of monetary policies on SHIBOR. Nevertheless, the 
central bank bill rate has certain impact on SHIBOR. 
 
4.5.2 Information Content of Market Interest Rates 
The second procedure of monetary transmission to be determined on SHIBOR is 
that whether changes in SHIBOR have an effect on the real economy. We also 
conduct a battery of Granger causality tests. Each row of Table 10 presents an 
equation that forecasts several macroeconomic indicators based on various market 
interest rates and measures of money supply, M1 and M2. We also add lags of M1 and 
M2 to compare the effects of interest rates.1 Macroeconomic indicators include 
investment, real estate investment, real estate sale, consumption, and consumer price 
index (CPI).  
Table 10 near here 
                                                              
1All the interest rates used are adjusted to monthly averages of daily figures and expressed as annual rates. 
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Table 10 shows that the overnight SHIBOR provides better prediction on  
macroeconomic indicators than the other eight variables do. All interest rates are 
superior to M1 and M2 in terms of prediction ability. In particular, M1 provides no 
reference for the movement of macroeconomic indicators. The overnight SHIBOR is 
also superior to the interbank offered overnight rate in prediction on the movement of 
three indicators. 
 
4.6 Interest Rate Term Structure 
Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) argue that the term structures of interest rates 
should reflect future economic trend. They prove that the term structure of the US 
Treasury bill rates has a strong prediction upon on the US economy for four years by 
employing Treasury bill rates data from 1955 to 1988. In this paper, we regard the 
seven-day interest rate and the overnight rate as the long-term rate and the short-term 
rate respectively, and estimate the following model: 
 
௧ܻ,௧ା௞ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ݅௧ ൅ ݁௧,      (10) 
 
௧ܻ,௧ା௞ ൌ ቀସ଴଴௞ ቁ ln	ሺ
ݕ௧ା௞ ݕ௧ሻൗ ,     (11) 
 
where k is the prediction term, and ݕ௧ is the GDP at time t. 
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݅௧ ൌ ݅௧௟௢௡௚	௧௘௥௠	௥௔௧௘ െ ݅௧௦௛௢௥௧	௧௘௥௠	௥௔௧௘.    (12) 
 
Most IBO rate coefficients on the GDP are statistically insignificant. When ݅௧ is 
larger than zero, the expectation of the future economy is optimistic; thus, the 
coefficient should be positive. Repo rates perform slightly better than the IBO rates 
but are still statistically insignificant.  
 
Table 11 near here 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Over the past two decades, China has adopted numerous policy changes to advance its 
financial market. Interest rate liberalization is one of the most important changes in 
this process. The Chinese interest rate market transformed from a fully controlled 
market to a dual-track interest rate market, under which banks and capital markets 
work together on the monetary resource allocation. However, regulatory controls over 
interest rates have not yet been implemented. A distinct market distortion along with 
quantitative controls also exists on credits. In this paper, we consider both 
international experiences and Chinese national situation when analyzing the choice of 
a benchmark rate for China. Although China currently does not have any interest rate 
which is perfect for benchmark rate, China can adopt a benchmark rate similar to 
LIBOR or the US Federal funds rate. 
Since 2006, SHIBOR rate has already shown some characteristics of benchmark 
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interest rates, though they are not very stable. SHIBOR is an interest rate based on a 
relatively large daily trading volume and has close relationships with other open 
market interest rates. The People’s Bank of China has been trying to promote the 
Shibor as the benchmark that provide reference for short-term borrowing costs. For 
longer-tenor categories, short-term repos is more popular as trading references because 
SHIBOR has no real traded prices for this category. If the market of negotiable 
certificate of deposit can take over the direct deposit deals in the future, Shibor might 
gain its market recognition and be a real market-oriented benchmark that is similar to  
Libor. Although SHIBOR may not be a good intermediate target of monetary policies 
in current transmission mechanism, it affects the market as well as the economy. As a 
result, SHIBOR is considered a potential benchmark interest rate. Interest rate 
liberalization in China is in progress, and a benchmark interest rate will play a 
significant role in future reforms. The People’s Bank of China should continue to 
pursue a systematic interest rate liberalization approach and encourage the use of 
SHIBOR in China’s financial market.  
 
6. Limitations and Future Direction 
The LIBOR manipulation scandal in 2012 revealed several serious problems of 
the interest rate quotation mechanism in choosing the market benchmark rate. A 
lesson learned from the LIBOR scandal is that fully relying on the interest rate 
quotation system can be injudicious and risky. Apart from the possibility of 
manipulation, SHIBOR may sometimes be very volatile. For example, on 20th of June 
2013, SHIBOR surged as the overnight SHIBOR rate had increased to 13.4%, which 
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was due to the temporary liquidity shortage in the inter-bank market. Thus, the 
People’s Bank of China should carry out proper regulation and mechanism to prevent 
market manipulation and reduce its volatility.  
An advantage of adopting SHIBOR as policy rate is that it has an off-shore 
counterpart to serve as a reference rate. The trial conducted by the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority (HKMA) on offshore RMB interbank offered market interest rate 
provides a good reference rate for SHIBOR. In June 2013, the HKMA announced a 
panel of 16 active commercial banks, which have since offered their interest rates on 
offshore RMB (CHN HIBOR). This system is similar to SHIBOR, facilitates the 
development of a variety of RMB products, and helps market participants to better 
evaluate the risk of interest rates denominated in RMB. The presence of CHN HIBOR 
provides a benchmark for offshore loan facilities, which supports interest rate 
liberalization in China and the use of Shibor as benchmark interest rate in future. 
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Figure 1. Federal Funds Rate (2001–2013) 
 
 
Figure 2. Treasury Bill Rate (2001-2013) 
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Figure 3. Overnight LIBOR Rate (2001–2013) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Seven-Day LIBOR Rate (2001–2013) 
 
30 
Figure 5. Central Bill Rate (2002–2011) 
 
Figure 6. Overnight and Seven-Day SHIBOR Rate (2006–2013) 
 
 
Figure 7. Overnight and Seven-Day Repo Rate (2001–2013) 
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Figure 8. Overnight and Seven-Day Interbank Borrowing Rate 
(2001–2013) 
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Figure 9. SHIBOR and Central Bank Bill Rate (2006-2011) 
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Table A. Benchmark Interest Rates around the World 
Country Benchmark Interest Rate 
United States Federal funds rate 
United Kingdom LIBOR 
France One-week bond repurchase rate 
Germany One-week and two-week bond repurchase rate 
Japan TIBOR 
Singapore SIBOR 
China One-year deposit and loan rate 
 
 
Table 1. SHIBOR vs LIBOR 
 SHIBOR LIBOR 
Panel Banks 18 domestic and foreign banks 16 large global banks 
Foundation Introduced by the central bank 
to build the benchmark rate 
Driven by market 
demand 
Price for 
Banks 
The operating expenses of 
Chinese banks are based on the 
controlled loan rate rather than 
SHIBOR, and only a small 
fraction of financial products 
are priced based on SHIBOR 
LIBOR decides almost 
all prices of financial 
products, thus directly 
affecting the profit of 
banks 
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Table 2. Interest Rate Summary 
 
Interest Rate Start Time End Time Number of Observations 
Funds 2001/01/02 2013/03/29 3080 
Bill 2001/01/02 2013/03/29 3070 
LIBOR001 2001/01/02 2013/04/05 3098 
LIBOR007 2001/01/02 2013/04/05 3098 
SHIBOR001 2006/10/09 2013/03/19 1614 
SHIBOR007 2006/10/09 2013/03/19 1614 
FR001 2001/01/01 2012/12/31 3009 
FR007 2001/01/01 2012/12/31 3009 
IBO001 2001/01/01 2010/12/31 2222 
IBO007 2001/01/01 2010/01/28 2483 
Central  2002/06/25 2011/10/20 125 
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Table 3. Trade Volume of Different Interest Rates in China 
 
(RMB, billion)2 
Year 
Interbank 
Borrowing 
Market 
Bond 
Repurchase 
Market 
Interbank 
Bond Market 
Rediscount 
Market 
Central 
Bank Bill 
2001 808 4013 84 65.5 
2002 1211 10189 441 6.8 194
2003 2222 11720 3085 74 764
2004 1392 9311 2504 22 1496
2005 1232 15678 6338 2.5 2766
2006 2148 26302 10922 40 3652
2007 10651 44067 16591 14 4057
2008 15049 56382 40827 11 4296
2009 19351 67701 48868 25 3824
2010 27868 84653 64003  4235
2011 33441 96665 63620  1414
2012 46704 136617 70840  
 
   
                                                              
2Data Source: People’s Bank of China, www.pbc.gov.cn 
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Table 4. ADF Tests for Interest Rates 
 
Interest Rate ADF Test First-difference ADF Test 
t-statistic 1% 
critical
p-value t-statisti
c 
1% 
critical
p-value 
Funds −1.97 −3.43 0.2998 −38.466 −3.43 0.00 
LIBOR001 −3.273 −3.43 0.0161 −38.102 −3.43 0.00 
LIBOR007 −1.019 −3.43 0.7463 −33.458 −3.43 0.00 
Bill −1.721 −3.43 0.4202 −29.485 −3.43 0.00 
Central −2.727 −3.502 0.0694 −4.651 −3.502 0.00 
SHIBOR001 −7.422 −3.43 0.00    
SHIBOR007 −6.909 −3.43 0.00    
FR001 −5.661 −3.43 0.00    
FR007 −7.708 −3.43 0.00    
IBO001 −6.364 −3.43 0.00    
IBO007 −8.145 −3.43 0.00    
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Table 5. EGARCH Regression 
 
Interest rate ߱ p-value ߙ p-value ߛ p-value ߚ p-value
Funds −0.71 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.94 0.00
Bill −0.06 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.87 0.00
LIBOR001 −0.09 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.98 0.00
SHIBOR001 −1.2 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.99 0.00
FR001 −1.3 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.97 0.00
IBO001 −1.42 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.89 0.00
 
 
Table 6. SHIBOR and Repo Rate 
(Probability) 
H0 Lags(1) Lags(2) Lags(7) 
SHIBOR001 does not Granger-cause FR001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FR001 does not Granger-cause SHIBOR001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
SHIBOR007 does not Granger-cause FR007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FR007 does not Granger-cause SHIBOR007 0.0069 0.0188 0.0003 
 
 
Table 7. SHIBOR and IBO Rate 
(Probability) 
H0 Lags(1) Lags(2) Lags(7) 
IBO001 does not Granger-cause SHIBOR001 0.2881 0.4807 0.9380 
SHIBOR001 does not Granger-cause IBO001 0.0873 0.1057 0.6623 
IBO007 does not Granger-cause SHIBOR007 0.0899 0.5984 0.0476 
SHIBOR007 does not Granger-cause IBO007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 8. Repo Rate and IBO Rate 
                                                           (Probability) 
H0 Lags(1) Lags(2) Lags(7) 
IBO001 does not Granger-cause FR001 0.4600 0.1414 0.6478 
FR001 does not Granger-cause IBO001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
IBO007 does not Granger-cause FR007 0.0126 0.1506 0.0004 
FR007 does not Granger-cause IBO007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Granger Causality Test of SHIBOR and Central 
H0 Probability 
SHIBOR001 does not Granger-cause Central 0.508 
Central does not Granger-cause SHIBOR001 0.270 
SHIBOR007 does not Granger-cause Central 0.682 
Central does not Granger-cause SHIBOR007 0.109 
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Table 10. Interest Rates for Forecasting Economic Activity 
(Marginal significance level) 
Forecasted 
Variable 
M1 M2 SHIBOR
001 
SHIBOR
007 
FR001 FR007 IBO
001 
IBO
007 
Consumption 0.52 0.06 0.00 0.31 0.43 0.96 0.57 0.12 
Investment 0.17 0.16 0.04 0.03 0.83 0.53 0.83 0.86 
Real Estate 
Investment 
0.65 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.71 0.00 0.02 
Real Estate 
Sale 
0.87 0.94 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.11 
CPI 0.41 0.68 0.12 0.05 0.16 0.02 0.06 0.00 
Table 11. Interest Rate Term Structure (with GDP) 
K (term) IBO Rate Repo Rate 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
1 −1597 0.46 −82.4 0.92 
2 123.6 0.914 1489.2 0.33 
3 −150.8 0.823 1112.8 0.26 
4 −389.6 0.28 1123.6 0.21 
5 −332.2 0.233 265.5 0.11 
10 −139.3 0.25 589.2 0.08 
15 488.6 0.148 536.6 0.16 
20 479.6 0.016 64.1 0.52 
 
